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 Abstract. The article deals with the problem of simple and complex objects in 
metaphysical research. It is stated that the ultimate simplification of reality 
theoretical models follows from the nature of metaphysical knowledge. The 
modern metaphysical conceptions of fundamental simplicity and fundamental 
complexity of existing objects are discussed. They are the conceptions of full 
and distributional monism, mereological nihilism, and the traditional binary or 
binary-based models of the foundations of reality, ascending to Aristotle. The 
paper shows that these conceptions and ideas do not simplify reality as much 
as possible. The problematic and ambiguous nature of the conceptions 
considered is that all complicating factors are not excluded in them. This 
leads to a situation where further grounding of the entities that are accepted 
as the simplest ones is required. The state of the full simplification in 
metaphysics is defined. It is argued that ultimate simplification requires the 
exclusion of qualitative multiplicity and quantitative definiteness, the exclusion 
of the distinction between substance and its qualities, between the entity and 
the law, the relation or condition which ground it. The entity identified in the 
process of ultimate simplification must be quantitatively indefinite, identical to 
its quality and substratum, indistinguishable from the law, the condition or the 
relationship of its grounding. Such an entity can be the starting point for the 
construction of a metaphysical model of the world as a consistent 
complication of entities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Explaining reality in which we find ourselves, we 
intuitively seek for simplicity. It seems natural 
that simple ideas are more plausible than com-
plex ones. The more complex reality commonly 
requires the greater volume and complexity of 
explanation. Before the searching mind there ap-
pears a frightening specter of infinite complica-
tion. The simple, on the contrary, is undoubtedly 
certain, clear, foreseeable. The problem of finding 
simple grounds is especially acute when one ex-
plains the world as a whole which is the task of 
metaphysics. 
The contradictions that arise in this case seem to 
have a general epistemological character, since 
they refer equally to metaphysics, and to special 
sciences. Both modern special sciences and mod-
ern metaphysics are in search of simple explana-
tions of complex phenomena. The results that we 
observe, however, are opposite to what one is 
looking for. This is most clearly manifested in 
modern natural sciences. Generally speaking, the 
natural-science theories are becoming more and 
more complicated. Explanations are often hard to 
grasp because of abundance and ambiguity of 
their details. The coordination of these details 
becomes a special and increasingly complex task. 
If a way out of this situation is possible, then, 
most likely, it will be realized by means of meta-
physics. Whatever scientific questions we an-
swer, they imply a preliminary answer to the 
metaphysical question: so is the world basically 
simple or infinitely complex? 
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In modern metaphysics this problem is undoubt-
edly realized, and attempts are being made to 
solve it. Moreover, it can be assessed as one of 
the central points in metaphysical discourse. The 
problem of simplicity is actively discussed in ana-
lytical metaphysics. Certain approaches, the prin-
ciples of its investigation have been worked out 
so far. First of all, it is necessary to take into ac-
count the division of simplicity into two kinds: 
ontological and ideological, accepted by meta-
physicians of the analytical tradition. Ontological 
simplicity (and accordingly, ontological complex-
ity) refers to simple entities, ideological simplic-
ity – to simple concepts.  
In other words, this is the distinction between 
things in the world and concepts needed to de-
scribe the world [1, p. 16]. S. Cowling represents 
it as the two kinds of theoretical parsimony: on-
tological parsimony, which concerns the mini-
mizing of ontological commitments, and ideo-
logical parsimony, which concerns the minimiz-
ing of ideological commitments [2, p. 3994].  
Another pair of simplicity markers in metaphys-
ics is quantitative and qualitative simplicity. It 
may also be expressed in terms of theoretical 
parsimony. Quantitative parsimony concerns the 
number of commitments while qualitative par-
simony concerns the number of kinds of com-
mitments [2, p. 3996]. In other words, quantita-
tive parsimony, as it is defined by S. Z. Elgin, in-
volves the number of entities a theory posits; 
qualitative parsimony involves the number of 
kinds of entities a theory posits [3, p. 3]. In both 
cases it goes about minimal quantity: in one case 
– the minimal quantity of primitive entities in the 
world; in another case – the minimal quantity of 
primitive kinds of entities.  
No understanding of these points of view is pos-
sible without the answers to some principal 
questions about the nature of simplicity and 
complexity as well as about their relations. To 
analyze the problem we need to know, first of all, 
whether it make sense to talk about simplicity 
and complexity? Is there both ontological and 
ideological simplicity or only one of them is 
worth deliberation? Is there something ulti-
mately simple in our world? Is there something 
complex in the world? Is everything complex re-
ducible to simple? Are complex entities formed 
by the simple ones? Accordingly, is it possible to 
build a metaphysical model of the world, based 
on ultimately simple entities? 
The aim of the paper is to reveal the place of sim-
plicity and complexity in metaphysics, answering 
the posed questions. To do this, we need to ana-
lyze the existing metaphysical conceptions of 
simplicity and complexity. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The complexity of accessible to us reality should 
be regarded as something empirically given. 
Even denying any complexity from the Eleatic 
position, it is necessary to explain this empirical 
complexity. At least in the form of an illusion, 
complexity exists, and there must be some expli-
cation of the fact. There must be a ground of 
complexity which may be itself something com-
plex or simple.  
Simplicity is less obvious. It is natural to doubt 
simplicity suspecting it to hide some implicit 
complexity. It is simplicity that looks more like an 
illusion. Disbelief in simplicity may be the matter 
of scientific intuition as in these words of T. Par-
sons (1976): “There is no prima facie reason to 
suppose that the universe contains a small num-
ber of things, or a small number of kinds of 
things. There is no prima facie reason to believe 
that a theory that endorses a smaller number of 
things, or kinds of things, or employs a smaller 
number of primitives, is simpler or likelier to be 
true or likely to yield more insight than another” 
[4, p. 660]. One more way of arguing against sim-
plicity is to refute initially plausible justifications 
for simplicity in metaphysics [5]. More sophisti-
cated anti-simplicity position is based on under-
standing that what is simple from one perspec-
tive is complex from another [6]. Thus, every-
thing simple in a certain sense is complex and 
vice versa. If such is the state of affairs, it re-
moves the question of something absolutely sim-
ple or absolutely complex as the ground for what 
exists. The very coexistence of simplicity and 
complexity in one is something complex. So the 
world is infinitely complex from this point of 
view.  
Are there any counterarguments refuting the 
proposed decision? One can say that reality, 
which is only complex, requires a ground of its 
complexity, it cannot be ungrounded. Any com-
plexity appeals for the answer to the question: 
why is it so complex? It follows that no complex 
entity can be the ultimate ground of existing to-
tality. Either the world lacks absolutely simple 
entities or there is no unique ground for every-
thing that exists. Only one of these alternatives 
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can be real. Assuming, as an axiom, the existence 
of an ultimate ground we conclude that there are 
not only complex entities in the world. There is 
something simpler and something more compli-
cated in absolute sense. The absolutely simple 
entity (if such entity or entities exist) is not com-
plex in a different sense.  
The idea that there are fundamental entities and 
their derivatives has sufficient support in mod-
ern metaphysics. This idea characterize what is 
called (according to F. Jackson’s words) the seri-
ous metaphysics. Three principles of the serious 
metaphysics are formulated by U. Kriegel. They 
are completeness (“Serious metaphysics at-
tempts to produce a total theory of the world, 
that is, a theory of everything”), discrimination 
(“Serious metaphysics discriminates between 
fundamental and derivative statements and no-
tions”), and entailment (“The relationship be-
tween fundamental and derivative statements in 
the total theory of the world is that of entail-
ment”) [7. p. 17]. By words of J. L. Dowell the se-
rious metaphysics is an attempt to say what the 
world is like in terms of a limited number of 
more or less basic notions [8, p. 91]. It is appar-
ent that the principle of fundamentality is formu-
lated here in “ideological” not “ontological” 
terms. But it doesn’t exclude ontological interpre-
tation. The main problem as for metaphysical 
simplicity is in getting to know whether the sim-
ple is fundamental or, differently, whether the 
fundamental is simple.  
The conception that there are fundamental enti-
ties and derived entities is related to simplicity 
and complexity. If fundamental entities exist, 
then they should be simpler than non-
fundamental entities. If simple entities are fun-
damental, then on their basis all other (non-
fundamental) entities are constructed. It follows 
from the premise of fundamentality. Thus, we 
have the ground to regard in metaphysical per-
spective the complexity as a complication of the 
simple. On the other hand, in the same perspec-
tive, a complex entity can be reduced to a simple 
one (or some simple ones). Simplification (at 
least in some cases) is equivalent to the funda-
mentalization of entities. This principle success-
fully works in many theoretical constructions. At 
the same time, no theory can avoid the use of 
conceptual primitives. 
Does it mean that metaphysical simplicity is only 
a theoretical (or ideological) phenomenon? We 
will find a positive answer to this question in de-
scriptive metaphysics – the trend in analytical 
philosophy, which goes back to the works of P. 
Strawson. The basic principle of descriptive 
metaphysics lies in the conviction that we are not 
able to go beyond our ideas about the world, eve-
rything that we are discussing is related to the 
so-called conceptual scheme. Only the existing 
system of concepts is the real subject of discus-
sion and description in metaphysics. From this 
point of view, we do not know how complex real-
ity is, but its description can be simple.  
But such a position is not correct. First, we can 
distinguish and contrast the knowledge of the 
world and the knowledge of our knowledge of 
the world. This opposition distinguishes in 
knowledge the part which is directly related to 
reality. Secondly, in any case, ideological simplic-
ity is impossible without the ontological one. If 
simple concepts correspond to reality, then ideo-
logical simplicity coincides with ontological sim-
plicity. If simple concepts do not correspond to 
reality, then the knowledge of ontologically sim-
ple entities (as far as it possible) should be pre-
ferred. Therefore, further on, only ontological 
simplicity will be discussed. 
How can something extremely simple look like in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative characteris-
tics? Firstly, it can be something substantially one 
and of unique quality. Secondly, it can be some-
thing substantially one and of multiple qualities. 
Thirdly, it can be something substantially multi-
ple and of unique quality. Fourthly, it can be 
something substantially multiple and of multiple 
qualities. Three of these four possibilities are re-
flected in modern metaphysical conceptions. 
Let the first of the four conceptions be called "the 
full monism". It generally coincides with the well-
known classical conception of the Eleatics. Any-
thing complex is excluded from this conception 
as there is no possible transition from qualita-
tively and quantitatively unique entity to com-
plex entities. So one can infer only that empirical 
complexity is an illusion. This situation doesn`t 
look plausible just because of the presence of il-
lusion and the subject possessing it. The subject 
and the subject`s illusions make the situation 
more complicated than it is acceptable for the full 
monism.  
The term “monism” in the nowadays metaphys-
ics often mark the conception of a unique multi-
qualitative reality. According to D. M. Cornell, it 
refers to the view that there is only a single mate-
rial object in existence: the world itself. The 
world is mereologically simple, it has no proper 
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parts [9, p. 2398]. The world, as a whole, has cer-
tain properties which give rise to the appearance 
of there being a multiplicity of material things. 
These properties D. M. Cornell call “distribu-
tional” as they ascribe to an object the particular 
way in which that quality is distributed across 
the extension of that object [9, p. 2405]. So it is 
natural to define the second of our possible 
metaphysical conceptions of fundamental sim-
plicity-complexity as “the distributional mo-
nism”. Another defender of this one category on-
tology L. A. Paul finds its advantage in that it col-
lapses the distinction between particular and 
property, replacing it with a single fundamental 
category of intrinsic characters or qualities [10, 
p. 32]. So it is the world where there are no enti-
ties apart from qualities and their distribution. 
The picture seems plausible but leaves some 
doubt as for its absolute simplicity. What proper-
ties are simple and why exactly these ones, why 
they are distributed this way and not another – is 
left without explanation. One may suppose that 
the layer of reality consisting of distributional 
properties is not fundamental. It needs further 
grounding.  
The third variant of fundamental simplicity is 
represented by the so called “mereological nihil-
ism”. In general form it is defined by T. Sider as 
the conception according to which composite en-
tities (entities with proper parts) do not exist [11, 
p. 237]. There exist only simple entities and their 
compositions. So there are “no chairs or tables, 
no rocks or planets, no planes, trains or automo-
biles” but there are “simples arranged chair-wise, 
rock-wise, and so on and so forth” [9, p. 2402]. 
Mereological simples apparently may have one 
and the same property or they may have differ-
ent properties. Let`s take one property simples. If 
such property does not fully coincide with a 
primitive fundamental entity, then the simplest 
entity appears to be in a sense complex which 
makes the whole picture questionable in the as-
pect of simplicity. If, on the contrary, there is co-
incidence of the stated property and an entity, 
then the question of the simples` multiplicity 
arises. Why are there so many quantitatively dif-
ferent objects in the fundamental layer of reality? 
This must have its ground which is to be made 
clear. 
The conception of mereological nihilism may be 
weakened by acceptance of some complex ob-
jects being in a sense primitive i. e. having prop-
erties not found in the fundamental layer of real-
ity. One such weakened nihilism conception be-
longs to P. van Inwagen who adds to physical 
simples living organisms as the second kind of 
real entities [12]. A more successive conception 
of that sort is called universalism. According to it 
any objects compose a further object. K. Miller 
discerns two types of universalism: generative 
universalism and non-generative universalism. 
The first presupposes that “for any set of particu-
lars there exists something that is composed of 
those particulars such that the composite is not 
identical to any one of its parts or to its parts 
considered collectively”. The second assumes 
that there are also “non-generative composites: 
composite objects that are identical to the totality 
of their parts or to the totality of their parts ar-
ranged in a certain way” [13, pp. 533–534]. Does 
this change the situation with primitive simples? 
Not much. New properties that arise in complex 
objects and new objects that look like ontological 
primitives increase the scope of fundamental en-
tities and fundamental qualities in need of 
grounding. The problem becomes more compli-
cated and tangled. But its essence remains the 
same: the objects which are regarded as ulti-
mately simple and fundamental are not really 
such. They are not ungrounded or self-grounded 
if there are generally grounding relations in the 
world. 
One can imagine fundamental essences that are 
extremely simple but diverse, differing from each 
other quantitatively and qualitatively. This is the 
fourth of the above options of fundamental sim-
plicity. The most popular are the traditional bi-
nary or binary-based models of the foundations 
of reality, ascending to Aristotle. A modern vari-
ant of such models based on Aristotle’s Catego-
ries is the so called “Ontological Square”, a four-
fold division of entities arising from two or-
thogonal distinctions: 1. attributes vs. sub-
stances; 2. universals vs. particulars. So we have 
as a result of cross-wise combination a categori-
cal scheme which comprises universal and par-
ticular substances, i. e. kinds and objects, as well 
as universal and particular attributes, i. e. charac-
ters and moments [14, p. 27]. This list of four 
categories exhausts the simplest entities. It 
makes an impression of logical completeness and 
besides it corresponds to our ordinary represen-
tations expressed in speech practice. But is this 
enough? It should be noted that the selected 
categories are not particulars. These are species 
that imply splitting into individual entities. Such a 
partition is not specified by the species them-
selves. It requires additional grounding, and this 
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circumstance makes the fundamental categories 
not extremely simple, but rather complex, there-
fore, not fundamental.  
In any of the versions of fundamental simplicity it 
appears necessary to have some addition in the 
form of a law, a condition or a grounding relation 
which make these entities the simplest ones. It 
seems that this addition gives an opportunity of a 
decisive choice in the process of simplification or 
otherwise – complication of reality. Some meta-
physicians propose evaluating theoretical sim-
plicity to take into account the number and the 
complexity of laws cited by a theory [15], the cir-
cumstances under which composition of entities 
occurs [13], the simplicity of grounding relations 
[3]. These considerations, nevertheless, do not 
remove further questions. Where do these laws, 
conditions, relations come from? If they are com-
pletely conditioned by the simplest entities that 
correlate, they do not add anything to the prob-
lem of grounding these entities. If they are not 
conditioned by the simplest entities, then they 
require their separate grounding as well as gen-
eral grounding for them and those entities they 
unite. In other words they require simplification. 
A possible answer to the situation is the concept 
of brutalism, based on the assertion that the con-
ditions for composing entities are a brute fact, 
which should not be further analyzed. According 
to N. Markosian whenever composition occurs or 
whenever it fails to occur, it is just a "brute fact" 
[16, pp. 4–5]. The concept of brutalism means in 
fact the total refusal to explain. Alternatively the 
explanation is shifted to entities themselves, both 
simple and complex, which, in turn, requires ex-
planations. Such a decision is hardly satisfactory 
from a metaphysical point of view.  
Does the review of contemporary theoretical 
models bring us closer to an understanding of 
simplicity and complexity in metaphysics? If we 
comprehend metaphysics as an extremely ab-
stract and general knowledge of the world, we 
have the clue to some positive decisions about 
simplicity and complexity. The ultimate abstract-
ness of metaphysical entities corresponds to 
their ultimate simplicity.  
What does the ultimate simplification of the ob-
jects of metaphysical consideration mean? To do 
this, it is necessary to exclude all the complicating 
factors, if possible, of course. If not, to explain 
why. The problematic and ambiguous nature of 
the conceptions considered is that all complicat-
ing factors are not excluded in them. This leads to 
a situation where further grounding of the enti-
ties that are accepted as the simplest ones is re-
quired. As a result, we have not the ultimate pic-
ture of what exists, but an empirically concrete 
one. 
To simplify the subject of research as much as 
possible, it is first of all necessary to exclude the 
ideological layer of description, to turn to the 
subject itself as an objective reality. Further, 
quantitative and qualitative multiplicity should 
be excluded. It is quite obvious that the simplest 
cannot be different, either quantitatively or in 
respect of different kinds. It may seem puzzling 
how the unique entity divide itself into the multi-
plicity of empirically fixed individual entities. 
However, the point is that the simplest should 
not be regarded as one entity in the arithmetic 
sense. In other words, the simplest should not be 
considered as the one. It just means that the ul-
timately simple has no quantitative definiteness. 
Quantitative definiteness complicates existence. 
The simplest entity must be out of quantity, this 
is something that cannot be counted.  
Naturally, one should exclude the difference be-
tween the property and the substance. This dif-
ference also complicates things. The simplest is 
that which is both the quality and the carrier of 
this quality. Moreover, the quality and the carrier 
in it are indistinguishable (they become discerni-
ble only if the simplest entity becomes more 
complicated). Finally, maximal simplification 
means excluding the difference between the en-
tity and its grounding. The law, relation or condi-
tion that sets the entity of the simplest kind 
should not be distinguished from the entity itself. 
The simplest entity and the law or condition of its 
existence, the relation that determines it should 
be the same. In other words, the entity must be 
for itself an action that causes its complication.  
If we have found such a simple entity, we have 
found the foundation of everything that exists in 
the world. First of all, it does not need grounding. 
At the same time, it is the ground for the exis-
tence of more complex entities, including things, 
properties, relationships, different forms of de-
terminism. It is possible to construct a meta-
physical picture of the world, using the simplest 
entity as a ground, the same entity as a ground-
ing relation, and again this entity as something 
grounded. Only in this case, metaphysics will be 
completely "serious", representing the process of 
constructing reality by successive complication 
the ultimately simple entity. 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem of complexity and simplicity of the 
existing is central in metaphysics. The desire for 
ultimate simplification of reality follows from the 
fundamental nature of metaphysical knowledge. 
Modern metaphysics carries out a search in this 
direction, relying on the guidelines of ontological 
and ideological simplicity, as well as quantitative 
and qualitative simplicity. The conceptions of 
fundamental simplicity and fundamental com-
plexity of the existing are discussed. Ideas of 
quantitative and qualitative monism or pluralism 
of the simplest entities are advanced. The paper 
shows that these conceptions and ideas do not 
simplify the reality as much as possible. Because 
of this, the identified simplest entities require 
further grounding. Ultimate simplification re-
quires the exclusion of qualitative multiplicity 
and quantitative definiteness, the exclusion of the 
distinction between substance and its qualities, 
between the entity and the law, the relation or 
condition which ground it. The entity identified 
in the process of ultimate simplification must be 
quantitatively indefinite, identical to its quality 
and substratum, indistinguishable from the law, 
the condition or the relationship of its grounding. 
Such an entity can be the starting point for the 
construction of a metaphysical model of the 
world as a consistent complication of entities. 
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